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APPENDIX B 
DOCUMENT DONITZ-100 1 
TESTIMONY OF FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ, U.S. NAVY, 11 MAY 
1946, REGARDING NAVAL WARFARE IN THE PACIFIC FROM 
7 DECEMBER 1941, INCLUDING THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING 
THE RESCUE OF SURVIVORS OF SUNK ENEMY SHIPS (EX-
HIBIT DONITZ-100) 
11 May 1946 
INTERROGATION OF FLEET ADMIRAL CHESTER W. NIMITZ, 
U.S. NAVY 
At the request of the International Military Tribunal the following 
interrogatories were on this date, 11 May 1946, put to Fleet Admiral 
Chester W. Nimitz, U.S. Navy by Lieutenant Commander Joseph L. 
Broderick, U.S. Naval Reserve, of the International Law Section, Office 
of the Judge Advocate General, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., 
who recorded verbatim the testimony of the witness. 
Admiral Nimitz was duly sworn by Lieutenant Commander Broderick 
and interrogated as follows: 
Q. What is your name, rank and present station? 
A. Chester W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral, United States Navy, Chief of 
Naval Operations of the United States Navy. 
1. Q. What positions in the U.S. Navy did you hold from December 
1941 until May 1945? 
A. Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. 
2. Q. Did the U.S.A. in her sea warfare against Japan announce 
certain waters to be areas of operation, blockade, danger, restri~­
tion, warning or the like? 
A. Yes. For the purpose of command of operations against Japan 
the Pacific Ocean areas were declared a theater of operations. 
3. Q. If yes, was it customary in such areas for submarines to attack 
merchantmen without warning with the exception of her own 
and those of her Allies? 
1 40 I.M.T. 109- 111. 
192 
193 
A. Yes, with the exception of hospital ships and other vessels under 
"safe conduct" voyages for humanitarian purposes. 
4. Q. Were you under orders to do so? 
A. The Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941 ordered 
unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. 
5. Q. Was it customary for submarines to attack Japanese merchant-
men without warning-outside of announced operation or simi-
lar areas since the outbreak of the war? 
A. The reply to this interrogatory involves matters outside the 
limits of my command during the \var; therefore I make no 
reply thereto. 
6. Q. Were you under orders to do so? 
A. The reply to this interrogatory involves matters outside the 
limits of my command during the war, therefore I make no 
reply thereto. 
-Page 2-
7. Q. If the practise of attacking without warning did not exist since 
the outbreak of the war, did it exist from a later date on? From 
what date on? 
A. The practice existed from 7 December 1941 in the declared 
zone of operations. 
8. Q. Did this practice correspond to issued orders? 
A. Yes. 
9. Q. Did it become known to the U.S. Naval authorities that Japa-
nese merchantmen were under orders to report any sighted U.S. 
submarine to the Japanese Armed Forces by radio? If yes, when 
did it become known? 
A. During the course of the war it became known to the U.S. 
Naval authorities that Japanese merchantmen in fact reported 
by radio to Japanese armed forces any information regarding 
sighting of U.S. submarines. 
10. Q. Did the U.S. submarines thereupon receive the order to attack 
without warning Japanese merchantmen, if this order did not 
exist already before? If yes, when? 
A. The order existed from 7 December 1941. 
11. Q. Did it become known to the U.S. Naval authorities that the 
Japanese Merchantmen were under orders to attack any U.S. 
submarine in any way suitable according to the situation, for 
instance by ramming, gun fire or by depth charges. If yes, when 
did it become known? 
A. Japanese merchantmen were usually armed and always attacked 
by any available means when feasible. 
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12. Q. Did the U.S. submarines thereupon receive the order of attack-
ing without warning Japanese merchantmen, if this order did 
not already exist before? If yes, when? 
A. The order existed from 7 December 1941. 
13. Q. Were, by order or on general principles, the U.S. submarines 
prohibited from carrying out rescue measures toward passengers 
and crews of ships sunk without warning in those cases where 
by doing so the safety of the own boat was endangered? 
-Page 3-
A. On general principles the U.S. submarines did not rescue enemy 
survivors if undue additional hazard to the submarine resulted 
or the submarine would thereby be prevented from accomplish-
ing its further mission. U.S. submarines were limited in rescue 
measures by small passenger-carrying facilities combined with the 
known desperate and suicidal character of the enemy. Therefore 
it was unsafe to pick up many survivors. Frequently survivors 
were given rubber boats and/ or provisions. Almost invariably 
survivors did not come aboard the submarine voluntarily and 
it was necessary to take them prisoner by force. 
14. Q. If such an order or principle did not exist, did the U.S. sub-
marines actually carry out rescue measures in the above men-
tioned cases? 
A. In numerous cases enemy survivors were rescued by U.S. sub-
mannes. 
15. Q. In answering the above question, does the expression "merchant-
men" mean any other kind of ships than those which were 
not warships? 
A. No. By "merchantmen" I mean all types of ships which were 
not combatant ships. Used in this sense it includes fishing 
boats, etc. 
16. Q. If yes, what kind of ships? 
A. The last answer covers this question. 
17. Q. Has any order of the U.S. Naval authorities mentioned in the 
above questionnaire concerning the tactics of U.S. submarines 
toward Japanese merchantmen been based on the grounds of 
reprisal? If yes, what orders? 
A. The unrestricted submarine and air warfare ordered on 7 
December 1941 resulted from the recognition of Japanese tactics 
revealed on that date. No further orders to U.S. submarines 
concerning tactics toward Japanese merchantmen throughout 
the war were based on reprisal, although specific instances of 
Japanese submarines' committing atrocities toward U.S. mer-
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chant marine survivors became known and would have justified 
such a course. 
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18. Q. Has this order or have these orders of the Japanese Government 
been announced as reprisals? 
A. The question is not clear. Therefore I make no reply thereto. 
19. Q. On the basis of what Japanese tactics was the reprisal considered 
justified? 
A. The unrestricted submarine and air warfare ordered by the 
Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941 was justified 
by the Japanese attacks on that date on U.S. bases, and on both 
armed and unarmed ships and nationals, without warning or 
declaration of war. 
' 
The above record of my testmony has been examined by me on this 
date and is in all respects accurate and true. 
11 May 1946 
Chester W. Nimitz 
CHESTER W. NIMITZ 
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy 
The witness, Chester W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy, was duly 
sworn by me prior to giving the above testimony and I do certify that 
the above is a true record of the testimony given by him. 
11 May 1946 
Joseph L. Broderick 
JOSEPH L. BRODERICK 
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. 
Naval Reserve 
